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ABSTRACT 
Economies can suffer shocks connected to election seasons, a phenomenon especially 
prevalent in developing countries. This paper uses a large panel data set to examine the 
relation between elections and inflation, first coined by Nordhaus in his article “Political 
Business Cycle” in 1975. Through an inferential analysis, I find no evidence of inflationary 
jumps around election season on a global level from 1996-2009. Indications of an opposite 
connection are detected, and more research needs to be undertaken before any conclusions 
can be drawn.  
KEYWORDS:  
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DISPOSITION 
The paper consists of eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the subject and the aim of 
the paper. The following chapter offers a background in theory regarding the political 
business cycle and motivates the authors choice of theoretichal framework. Chapter three 
presents the data set used and reviews the weaknesses encountered in the data set. Chapter 
four executes empirical analysis, both descriptive and inferential. Results are presented in 
chapter five for each independent variable. In order to coorect for effects attached to the 
regression, robustness tests are being undertaken in chapter six. The results are discussed in 
chapter seven, and conclusions are being drawn in chapter eight. References and data are 
presented in the end of the paper. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Norwegian Council for Africa spelled in September 2010 out fears of an increased 
spending in advance of the 2011 election in Nigeria, putting inflationary pressures on an 
economy with skewed distribution of income.  
The impacts and prevalence of inflation during election season has been investigated by a 
number of scholars and the original theory the “Political Business Cycle” was coined by 
William D. Nordhaus in 1975. Recent studies have taken a fiscal spending approach, 
investigating government deficits but neglecting the shock effects increased spending can 
have on inflation. The Norwegian Council for Africa: 
“Money politics that makes politicians want to loot in office to recover their “investment” is 
unhealthy. It stunts the growth of democracy and economic development.” 
Elections, being the fundament of a democracy are viewed as a positive public good for the 
voters. But the existence of election cycles might distort economic well-being, inflating the 
economy through fiscal and monetary policies. This study investigates the prevalence of 
political business cycles on a global level during the last two decades. The findings give no 
evidence of inflationary tendencies during election season on an international level. Because 
of the lack of inferential proof, earlier theories on political business cycles cannot be verified. 
This sheds light on the fact that the PBC theory still is a field of research where the 
connection between elections and inflation demands more research before conclusions can be 
drawn.  
1.2 PURPOSE OF STUDY 
This study will investigate if there is a correlation between election year and inflation, for a 
wide set of countries. Alesina, Cohen and Roubini examined the topic for OECD-countries in 
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1992, and Shi and Svensson (2005) have made cross-country comparisons on governmental 
spending. But the vast amount of studies lacks examination on Political Business Cycles with 
inflation as a dependent variable for a large set of countries. My work will contribute to the 
political business cycle literature, by testing for changes in inflation around election season on 
a large panel data. It is the author’s aim, that the large scope will enhance the understanding 
on political business cycles on a global level.Dispostitionen, hur jag lägger upp det? 
2. THEORY 2.1 FOUR CONCEPTS FOR STARTERS 
When approaching the literature on elections and inflations, there are four elementary 
concepts (Shi & Svensson 2005, p.1369) that will be presented before examining the 
theoretical literature: 
Information asymmetry – the electorate and incumbents have different access to information. 
The incumbents are aware of this, and in order to signal their competency before an upcoming 
election, fiscal and/or monetary instruments are being mobilized (raising transfers, lowering 
taxes, investing in high-exposed projects). But the leeway for policy actions and the available 
information for the electorate depend on the institutional constraints.  
Institutional constraints – The monetary policy is often constrained by the central bank, 
setting the interest rate and controlling the money supply. Such actions limit the possibilities 
for a government to finance a social project during election season, aiming at increasing its’ 
popularity. The press poses another institutional constraint, scrutinizing (to different extents) 
the politicians and making information accessible. Another indicator of the access to 
information is the dictated by the supply and prevalence of consumer communications such as 
computers, internet and cellular phones. 
Incentives – since both information and financial policies are two ways of exerting an 
influence on the electorate, incumbents try to use these as tools for shaping the public opinion 
and to get re-elected.  
Time inconsistency – Policies are time consistent when there are no incentives to diverge in 
the future from promises made in the past. The government can pledge to consistently keep 
the inflation rate low, but once there is an incentive to deviate from the promises - like in the 
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light of winning an election, the possibility of expanding demand and lowering 
unemployment may become too tempting.  2.2 NORDHAUS’S POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE 
Abovementioned arguments ignited a debate in the 1970’s on the interaction between 
economic and political factors, a field previously dominated by macroeconomic studies, 
taking political factors as exogenous (Nordhaus 1989, p.2). The new view on elections where 
economic and political factors interacted was pioneered by William D. Nordhaus, who 
released his theoretical paper named “Political Business cycle” (PBC) in 1975. He argued that 
incumbents aim at maximizing votes during election season. But since the electorate does not 
have perfect information, a striving incumbent do best in signaling his competence. How the 
competence is received depends on the conception of the electorate. The understanding of the 
electorates’ characteristics would prove to become one of the main points dividing the 
scholars. Nordhaus claimed that the voters have little information on policies, and choose to 
form their expectations on incumbent parties based on past behavior. If the party running for 
re-election fails to reach these expectations, the voter will vote against the incumbent 
(Nordhaus 1975, p.172). Nordhaus’s cycle was later named “the opportunistic cycle”, 
analyzing the Phillipsian dilemma between inflation and unemployment.  
There are a number of different Political Business Cycle Models, which will be polarized in 
order to motivate why I have chosen one of them – the opportunistic model – as the 
framework for this study. But first I will review previous findings.  2.3 PREVIOUS FINDINGS 
2.3.1 Theoretical findings 
Over the years, a handful of theories on elections and inflation has emerged. Hibbs focused on 
the political colors’ influence on elections and their aftermath, and came to the conclusion that 
right-wing incumbents rather fight inflation than unemployment. Left-wing incumbents 
consider low unemployment as an end in itself, inflation being the mean to achieve it (Hibbs 
1997, p.1467). Assumptions on the ideological preferences over the trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment (commonly named partisan theory) were further developed by 
Alesina, introducing partisan cycles. Left-wing governments were claimed to lower the 
unemployment and raise inflation at the beginning of term of office, opposite to right-wing 
governments. Compared with the PBC, Alesina argues that right-wing governments do show 
a pattern of growth and unemployment consistent with the view of Nordhaus’ PBC. Whereas 
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left-wing governments’ fight high unemployment and achieve economic expansion early in 
their terms. The pattern of output growth and unemployment has no support in Nordhaus’s 
theories (1975). But partisan theories and the PBC share consensus on a pattern of pre-
election financial expansion, and a shortsightedness among the politicians. At the end of the 
1980’s, Kenneth Rogoff released his theory on PBC’s- “Political Equilibrium Political Budget 
Cycles” (1990), questioning Nordhaus’s assumption on voters being naïve and retrospective. 
Rogoff argued that voters are rational and forward-looking and that both electorate and 
incumbents were utility maximizing. The paper introduces an “equilibrium framework”, 
designed for analyzing how to mitigate electoral cycles (Rogoff 1990, p.2) He also included a 
measure for Central Bank Independency in the calculations. 
Rogoff finds that efforts to mitigate the election cycles can prove to be counterproductive, 
because mitigation might impede the signaling process (incumbents efforts to convince the 
electorate of their competency) or by inducing politicians to choose more expensive ways to 
signal. Pre-election budget antics might be a socially efficient mechanism in order to diffuse 
up-to-date information about their competence (Rogoff 1990, p.4). 
2.3.2 Empirical findings 
After Nordhaus’s release of the PBC, conclusions on the political business cycle were 
generally drawn upon studies of the US-elections until the late 1980’s, (Chappell & Keech 
1983; Alesina & Sachs 1987). During the 1990’s and 2000’s studies started to focus on 
OECD-countries (Alesina & Roubini, 1990) and developing countries (Brender & Drazen, 
2003; Shi & Svensson, 2005). Alesina and Roubini tested for if GNP growth, unemployment 
and inflation are systematically affected by the timing of elections and changes in 
governments. They found no evidence for the opportunistic cycle of Nordhaus for either 
output or unemployment (except for 3 out of 16 countries). This is to be viewed in the light of 
a rational electorate (the authors used the theory of Rogoff) imposing limiting the leeway for 
incumbents pursuing opportunistic policies. For inflation, an electoral cycle was found, 
consistent with the budget cycle models outlined in Rogoff & Sibert (1988). Alesina & 
Roubini claimed further that opportunistic monetary and fiscal policies might be a rule rather 
than exception, when observing the changes in inflation (Alesina & Roubini 1990, p.31) But 
timing the expansions before election season might be hard to achieve (Alesina & Roubini 
1990, p.30). 
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From a theoretical framework, one could argue that election cycles would be even more 
common among developing countries. With a short experience of electoral politics, a state-
controlled media, the electorate’s lack of information and a weak central bank, fiscal 
manipulation might prevail on a greater scale.  
Brender and Drazen (2003) investigated this hypothesis, taking a state-focused perspective 
and investigating fiscal balance, revenues and expenditure in order to identify political fiscal 
cycles. They found political fiscal cycles being a phenomenon of new democracies. The 
cycles are allowed to proceed, since the electorate lack experience with electoral politics. 
Using models viewing the voters as “fiscal conservatives”, the authors claim that once a 
country gains experience in electoral politics, the political fiscal cycle should disappear from 
the macro level (Brender & Drazen 2003, p.21).  
Shi and Svensson (2005) do also take a fiscal approach to cycles. Examining a great panel of 
countries (85 countries between 1975-1995) the authors conclude that on average, 
government deficit as a share of GDP increases by almost one percentage point in election 
years. This implies that the fiscal deficit increases by 22% on average in election years. The 
political budget cycles are much larger in developing countries compared to developed 
countries, and statistically less biased. Strong institutional constraints on politicians in 
developed countries leave little room for seeking ego rents through expropriating public 
resources.  Fiscal manipulations are also less effective, because of the supply of information 
to the electorate. The authors conclude how these institutional differences make a huge 
difference when estimating the size of the political budget cycle (Shi & Svensson 2005, 
p.1386). 
2.3.3 Theoretical framework 
This study on electoral cycles will not do explicit assumptions on the colors of the 
incumbents. The extent of data and diversity of countries, combined with the present time 
frames limits the research. Therefore, with the presumptions on a cycle, not sensitive for party 
affiliation, I dismiss the ideological (partisan) model. The model with ultrarational voters is 
based on the assumption that voters have the same access to information as parties and do not 
suffer from memory lapses and are forward-looking. Thus, the electorate cannot be fooled be 
politicians, why no political business cycles will emerge, which disqualifies the model from 
the study. The external shocks model predicts that shocks to the economy stems from external 
events. Here, the information attributed to the electorate matters a great deal. Voters with 
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perfect information will understand the force majeure nature of the shock, not blaming the 
party in office. Uninformed voters however, will blame the incumbents and vote them out of 
office (Nordhaus 1989, p.4ff). Because of the great sample of countries and the demand of 
data on information supplied to the electorate, I will not use the external shock model as a 
framework, since with an extensive panel data, the possibilities for identifying shocks are 
greater. The four models all take for granted that parties are perfectly competent, suggesting 
that Pareto-efficient outcomes would occur. Parties may act opportunistic or ideological, but 
are not wasting resources on inefficient actions. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) claimed that 
governments learn about their competence before the electorate, and are thus able to hide the 
incompetence until after the election (Rogoff & Sibert 1988, p.2). Because of the difficulties 
in determining the competence, especially on a larger scale, I choose to drop Rogoff and 
Sibert´s assumption, gaining generalization but losing accuracy. One has to be aware that, 
when aiming for designing a model on politico-economic behavior, it is hard to detect any 
clear pattern. With the present diversity of institutions, party structures, sources of shocks and 
degrees of rationality and competence, I find a generalizable model more apt, and thus choose 
the opportunistic model by Nordhaus. The model’s rather simple assumptions have to be seen 
in the light of generalization, not losing awareness of the effects that might prevail.  
2.3.3.1 The opportunistic model 
The opportunistic model is built upon assumptions of voters, parties, economic structure, 
sources of shocks and competence of parties. 
• Voters asses the incumbent party based on past accomplishments, and do not look 
prospectively when deciding on what party to vote for. The electorate does not have 
perfect information. 
• Parties are vote-maximizing opportunists. They use their power in order to win next 
election, rather than engaging in partisan politics. 
• The economic structure outlines who controls the policy instruments. The 
opportunistic model assumes that parties have control over policy instruments, and 
policy is effective.  
• The sources of shocks are internal to the economy and are assumed to come from 
political decisions. 
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• The parties are competent. 
Parties, reacting on the lack of information and shortsightedness of the electorate, will use 
available policy instruments in order to signal their competence to the electorate, stimulating 
the economy close to election season. The model takes for granted that, in lack of good 
measures of performance, the electorate will rate the incumbent with economic measures (e.g. 
unemployment).  
The behavior of the incumbent party is a typical time inconsistent act. Convincing the 
electorate of competence, especially when done through monetary policies postpones the 
burden of inflation to the future, in order to win the present election. 
Politicians can use two tools to influence the economic situation: fiscal policy (taxation, 
raising transfers etc.) and monetary policy (changing nominal interest rates, controlling 
commercial banks’ lending, currency boards etc.) To what extent do incumbents or politicians 
in general use the tools? If the central bank is independent, monetary tools are not available to 
use for short-run actions (such as financing by printing money). Another gatekeeper is the 
press, scrutinizing budget policies. The voters’ readiness to control and question the policies 
depends on the economic situation, and incentives. If the economic situation is unsecure, 
some voters might seek short-run gains instead of peeking into uncertainty. Corruption does 
occur and as Rothstein among others writes, households’ votes can be bought in exchange for 
subsidized food, shortened waiting-time for medical service and other advantages (Ahlbäck 
Öberg et. al, 2010).  
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3. DATA 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
The panel data consists of cross-sectional and stationary data for 96 countries; including years 
of election, inflation (annual % change in CPI), GDP and a central bank independence index 
(CBI)1 between 1996 and 2010. Inflation and GDP are downloaded from the World Bank’s 
database and the election data is extracted from the International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems (IFES) Election Guide2. The central bank independence index is created by 
Cukierman et. al (1992) and modified by Polillo and Guillén (2005). I include the CBI, based 
on the general assumption that countries with a higher central bank independency have 
average lower inflation rates. This is supported by the empirical research of Alesina (1989) 
and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). I have chosen not to include any data on 
freedom of press, since the panel data includes 96 countries, of whom many lack data on 
freedom of press over time.  
Some countries conduct both legislative and presidential elections. These countries have not 
been included in the sample (given that the elections do not take place the same year) since it 
is hard to assess who controls financial and monetary policies - and even more important - 
who has an incentive to use the policy instruments for own gains. Some exceptions have been 
done, where the distribution of power 
and incentives is well known (e.g. 
Germany). Election years have 
been counted if preceded and 
followed by a year of inflation 
data, and the election cycles are 
counted from 5 years before the 
election until 6 years after3.  
                                                               1  A thourough explanation of the variables is offered in the Data Appendix. 
2 An international nonprofit organization launched and financed by the USAID. 
3 Usually the electional cycles are shorter, where 5 years is the average period between elections. 
Figure 1: Scatter plot of inflation and years from election 
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3.2 EXPLORING THE DATA 
Plotting the observations of inflation reveal a group of outliers: Angola, Venezuela and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo display a number of high values, ranging from +200% to 
+4140% that will bias baseline findings on the panel data. The outliers have been deleted 
before the execution of a regression analysis. The regression analysis reveals the outliers 
violating the rule of 3 standard deviations from the mean value, which also has been removed. 
When erasing all the outliers (36), the mean changes from 11,93 to 6,27 and standard 
deviation changes from 111,46 to 6,27. The original sample included 1281 observations, and 
erasing 36 outliers (representing 2,8% of original sample) will not bias the outcome. The final 
sample consists of 1245 observations and 273 elections for 98 countries, which matches the 
requirements for sample size posed by Tabachnik and Fidell (p. 123, 2007): N > 50 + 
8*(number of independent variables). All observations have data on inflation and elections, 
but may have missing values for other variables.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics         
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Max Min 
inflation 1245 5,90 6,27 36,97 -10,07 
     no election 972 6,03 5,95 36,97 -10,07 
     election 273 5,44 5,33 36,10 -2,30 
GDP 1448 11445,24 13230,38 74113,94 149,21 
CBI 782 0,51 0,19 0,86 0,14 
 3.3 WEAKNESSES IN THE DATA 
3.3.1 INFLATION 
A critical attitude towards some of the data on inflation is sound, since some governments 
might act opportunistic and disclose some information to authorities, or lack the tools and 
infrastructure for collecting the data. The data on inflation may be biased by overall trends in 
inflation during the 1990’s and first decade of 2000’s. The character of inflation can pose a 
challenge, since high inflationary countries are prone to higher fluctuation. A higher variation 
could create heteroscedastic variables, which will be investigated in the regression analysis. 
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Other shocks influencing the price level are changes in oil prices and fluctuations on the 
commodity market. From the descriptive analysis on the data, both Venezuela and Turkey 
suffered from high and fluctuating inflation in the 1990’s1.  Caution must be taken, since 
inflationary jumps might occur because of other factors not captured by the regression model. 
This will be corrected by including a time dummy in the regression, mitigating any time 
trends influencing the data.  
3.3.2 CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 
The CBI-index lacks comprehensiveness, offering observations for 49 of the 98 countries. 
The Cukierman CBI-index suffers from some short-comings: Lohmann (1998) points out that 
taking a legalistic approach when measuring central banks can be problematic. An extremely 
independent central bank as the German Central Bank are bound to react to political 
pressures, when it’s institutional basis are undermined by political coalitions. Pointing out the 
gap between legal code and institutional practice clearly shows that measuring independency 
from a strictly legal perspective can prove misleading, both when analyzing developed and 
developing countries. 
      
 
                                                               1See Figure A1 in Appendix. 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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 4.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Executing a new scatter plot 
for the panel data without 
outliers, the majority are 
scattered between -1 to +1 
years from election. This is 
expected, since the choice of 
data on election years has 
been chosen if preceded and 
followed by 1 year of 
inflation data. Although the 
concentration of 
observations around election 
year is more lower and more 
compact, the amount of variables in year -1 and +1 with higher inflation is too few to have 
any statistical connection between election year and inflationary jumps. Interpreting the 
Nordhaus´s PBC, the plot would have been triangular-shaped, either peaking the election year 
or the following years. Thus, no evidence for a global PBC can be found on a descriptive 
level. 4.2 TESTING THE ASSUMPTIONS 
Before executing a regression analysis, I will test the assumptions of normality, bivariate 
correlation homoscedasticity and multicollinearity. Autocorrelation will not occur, since the 
regression includes time dummies. The panel data has been checked for normality, and 
standardized residuals of more than 3.3 or less than -3.3 has been deleted, following the 
recommendations of Tabachnik and Fidell (2007, p.156).  
Loungani and Sheets (1997, p.381) argues that real GDP growth is negatively correlated with 
central bank independence. This study takes annual GDP in account, and thus should not 
depend on the other dependent variable, central bank independence. But for safety reasons, I 
test the dependent variables in a correlation analysis. None of the coefficients show VIF-
Figure 2: Scatter plot of inflation and years from election, 
outliers removed 
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values exceeding 3,51, which concludes no case for multicollinearity. For correlation I have 
used the Pearson Correlation values, and no variables show any sign of bivariate correlation.2 
The correlation values were generally low, suggesting that the connection might be weak for 
the formulated model. The correlational issue will be covered more thoroughly in the section 
Regression Analysis.  
In order to remove trend effects from the data, time dummies are added to the specification. 
The time dummies have been tested and proved to be independently significant according to 
the values of an F-test. Due to the limitations of the software3, I am not able to mitigate 
heteroscedasticity by running a regression with robust standard errors. In order to hedge out 
the risks of heteroscedasticity, I will revise the panel data. Since the majority of the panel data 
is collected by the World Bank, I presume a smaller likeliness of making errors during the 
collection. Outliers, another factor for heteroscedasticity, have previously been deleted. 
Variances in the inflation data are likely to produce different variances in the residuals, which 
might produce heteroscedasticity. Since the standard errors sharply declined when deleting 
the outliers (see Data Section), I will reject this argument. When plotting the dependent 
variables against the independent variable, no form possibly violating the assumption of 
homoscedasticity could be detected. For the panel data, heteroscedasticity could appear in the 
cross sectional data. Gujarati (2002, p.394) argues that even in the case of heteroscedasticity, 
the coefficient will be linear unbiased and consistent. But it is not efficient and thus no longer 
has the minimum variance. This could lead to a biased inference when executing the 
regression, and the possibility of rejecting a null hypothesis, even if the null hypothesis is not 
characteristic for the population (type II error). Another source of heteroscedasticity is that the 
function might not be correctly specified, resulting in wrong functional form. Relying on 
previous studies4 that include this study’s variables, I reject the suspicion of wrong functional 
form.                                                                 1 See table A2 in Appendix.  
2 See table A3 in Appendix. 3 SPSS version 5 does not offer running a regression with White‐corrected robust standard errors, given that the user not has knowledge of how to construct a script. 
4 Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1992) investigate political business cycles in industrial economies using the rate of growth in monetary base as dependent variable. This study will use inflation as the dependent variable. 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4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
To test the PBC hypothesis on the pooled cross-section time-series data, the following panel 
regression was run: 
 
Where INFLit is the annual rate of inflation for region i at time t. ELEit is the election dummy, 
taking a value of one the year an election is held. The PBC theory argues that the coefficient 
of ELEit should be positive and significantly different from zero, indicating that the inflation 
rate is higher during election year. Ln_GDPit is the natural logarithm of GDP, influencing the 
inflation rate if significantly different from zero. The CBIit is the central bank independence 
index which is expected to be negative (for OECD-countries) and significantly different from 
zero, based upon the abovementioned research of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). 
REG is a region dummy1, having the value one if representing the specified country. I include 
the region dummy suspecting to detect region-bound differences, errors that might be 
correlated between countries because of increased linkages. YEAR is a time dummy for the 
years 1996-2009, which will detect any trends (e.g. oil-booms, crises and fluctuations in 
commodity prices) influencing the price level. The last two dummies cover fixed effects.   
My hypothesis assumes a linear regression model predicting the inflation for the panel data. 
Since the variance among our GDP variables are not constant, and spanning over such a huge 
and diverse set of countries, I log the values in order to give the values with great variance 
lesser importance in the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                1 Countries in the sample and their respective regions are listed in the Appendix, Table A4. 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Table 2: Regressions       
Dep. Variable: Inflation       
Regression 1 2 3 
Method Fixed effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
constant 1,681** 24,571*** 25,702*** 
 (0,803) -3,030 (4,733) 
ELE -0,374 -0,351 -0,354 
 (-0,600) (0,586) (0,793) 
ln_GDP   -2,242*** -2,249*** 
  (0,287) (0,388) 
CBI     -1,312 
   -2,740 
dum_south america 6,140*** 3,187** 2,874 
 (1,013) (1,059) (1,574) 
dum_central america 2,919*** -0,320 -0,470 
 (0,813) (0,879) (1,501) 
dum_north america -0,736 ,046 -0,423 
 (1,804) (1,764) (2,581) 
dum_oceania -0,404 -0,356 -1,071 
 (1,805) (1,762) (2,813) 
dum_south asia 0,837 -2,608 -3,439 
 (1,806) (1,817) (3,009) 
dum_east asia 4,050*** -1,077 -1,542 
 (0,918) (1,111) -1,790 
dum_middle east 2,071** -0,995 -1,562 
 (1,006) (1,058) (1,857) 
dum_subsahara 6,568*** 0,72 -0,423 
 (0,766) (1,118) (1,832) 
timedummies (1996-2008) included     
R2 0,118 0,160 0,161 
R2 (adj) 0,102 0,144 0,130 
N 1338 1338 766 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Region dummy "Europe" and time dummy "2009" have 
been left out.  
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 
***p<0.001 
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5. RESULTS  
5.1 GDP 
The variable ln_GDP is significant throughout the tests on a 1% level, and increase the 
goodness of fit (adjusted R2) from 10,2% to 14,4%. Since ln_GDP raise the goodness of fit, I 
ran some different regressions, with and without the present variable. The results show that 
GDP on average raise the level of explanation 4,5 percentage points. Thus, GDP is an 
important coefficient when trying to explain different levels of inflation in our panel data. 
This proves that GDP is an important explaining variable when to know what determines the 
level of inflation. Even though a higher GDP in some south american countries proved to 
raise inflation, the absolute level of GDP lower a countries price level with 2,24 percentage 
points per unit logged GDP. 5.2 REGIONS 
The coefficients for Central America are significant at 1% in regression 1. I therefore run a 
regression exclusively on Central America as a region. Both logged GDP and the CBI are 
significant, at 5% and 1% respectively. A coefficient of 20,959, claiming that with every unit 
of more Central Bank independence, the inflation raise with almost 21%. Rejecting the CBI 
might be wrong, but as mentioned in the data section has the CBI-index not proven apt for 
countries where the legal and institutional practices diverge. Does this tell us more about the 
character of the CBI-index or of the Central America as a region? Historically, Central 
America has proven to show some signs of PBC’s. This study’s relatively updated data, 
stretching from 1996-2009, focuses on the latest 14 years, when a great deal of institutional 
reform has been done (Dayton-Johnson et. al 2011, p.9). However, the results of the 
regression pose arguments against such theories. In South America, Central Banks 
Independence has no significance but GDP is significant at the 5% level with a surprising 
coefficient value of +4,411. When logged GDP increases by one unit, this trickles down on 
inflation, raising it by 4,4 percentage points. This might seem odd since for all countries, GDP 
on a global level decreases inflation. To what extent are the national economies of South 
America being influenced by inflation? Large government and a huge dependency on 
commodity prices (Venezuela and Bolivia) might well influence the respective price levels, 
given these are substantial and not captured by the time dummies. In the same regression on 
the central-american region, GDP displays a coefficient value of -1,259 at a significance level 
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of 5%, which questions our first findings. In the case of Central America, land dummies 
might have been preferred, because of the diverse results and different politico-economic 
structures in the region. 
The Sub-Saharan group shows a significant value for the CBI-coefficient at a 5% level, 
lowering the inflation with 41% per unit CBI, an astonishing result seemingly too high for the 
region. The connection of central bank independence to inflation is strong; the coefficient of -
41,24 suggests substantial decreases on the price level with a more independent central bank. 
But in the panel data, only 8 out of 25 countries have a CBI-data. This proves some 
explanation that the sample is not proving a population large enough to conclude the 
connection.  
When including the natural logarithm of GDP, every region dummy but the south-american 
one loses its’ significance at the 10% level. This suggests that the trend of an overall higher 
and fluctuating inflation in South America, confirmed by a relatively high mean and standard 
errors1. 
The election dummy is not significant in any of the groups. With a p-value never reaching a 
10% significance, and coefficient-values of ±1 (except for Sub-Sahara, displaying -2,5) 
clearly suggest that we cannot find evidence for any inflation jumps during election season, 
neither can the model be rejected (because of the insignificance) in the light of the last two 
decades’ experiences.  5.3 ELECTION DUMMY 
Regressions made do often display insignificant or values close to insignificance for the 
election dummy. The values range from -1.1 to -0.5, suggesting that inflation decreases during 
election year, on the contrary to what many scholars have suggested, launching a political 
business cycle. Because of the insignificant results, further research is needed, to validate any 
correlation. 5.4 SUMMARY 
Since no earlier studies have been done on such a huge and diverse set of countries, it is hard 
to conclude if the results are biased or just insignificant. Price level decreases during election 
                                                               1 See table A5 in Appendix. 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year could be the result of a lagged effect of increased public spending, postponing the 
inflationary effects. To test this, I will perform a robustness test. 
6. ROBUSTNESS TEST 
I ran a number of robustness tests on the results reported above. First, the original election 
dummy does not take into account whether election is taking place early or late in the 
observed year. Thus, we have reasons to believe that there might be lags attached to the 
expected effects of inflationary jumps. To capture this timing effect, I constructed two new 
election dummies: one for the year preceding the election (ELEt+1) and one for the year 
following the election (ELEt-1).  
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Table 3: Robustness tests           
Dep. Variable: 
Inflation             
Regression 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Method 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Constant 1,646** 24,546*** 25,629*** 1,508* 24,142*** 25,511*** 
  (0,788) (3,027) (4,729) (0,799) (3,029) (4,736) 
dum_ELE_t-1 -0,444 -0,435 -0,441    
  (0,611) (0,597) (0,807)       
dum_ELE_t+1    0,185 0,235 0,217 
        (0,632) (0,617) (0,836) 
ln_GDP  -2,242*** -2,250  -2,244*** -2,251*** 
    (0,287) (0,388)   (0,287) (0,388) 
CBI   -1,328   -1,271 
      (2,740)     (2,743) 
dum_south america 6,144*** 3,19** 2,874 6,184*** 3,193** 2,890* 
  (1,013) (1,059) (1,574) (1,013) (1,059) (1,575) 
dum_central america 2,927*** -0,250 -0,469 2,939*** -0,014 -0,439 
  (0,813) (0,879) (1,501) (0,813) (0,879) (1,502) 
dum_north america -0,754 0,280 -0,447 -0,751 0,300 -0,424 
  (1,804) (1,764) (2,581) (1,805) (1,765) (2,581) 
dum_oceania -0,388 -0,339 -1,062 -0,444 -,397 -1,089 
  (1,805) (1,762) (2,813) (1,805) (1,762) (2,813) 
dum_south asia 0,84 -2,608 -3,449 0,893 -2,554 -3,360 
  (1,805) (1,816) (3,009) (1,805) (1,817) (3,012) 
dum_east asia 4,049 -1,080 -1,551 4,078*** -1,052 -1,504 
  (0,918) (1,11) (1,790) (0,918) (1,110) (1,791) 
dum_middle east 2,070** -0,997 -1,571 2,082** -,985 -1,535 
  (1,006) (1,057) (1,857) (1,006) (1,058) (1,859) 
dum_subsahara 6,574*** 0,750 -0,425 6,593*** 0,092 -0,387 
  (0,766) (1,117) (1,831) (0,766) (1,118) (1,833) 
Time dummies (1996-2008) 
included.           
R2 0,118 0,160 0,161 0,118 0,160 0,160 
R2 (adj) 0,102 0,145 0,130 0,102 0,144 0,130 
N 1338 1338 766 1338 1338 766 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Region dummy "Europe" and time dummy "2009" have been 
left out.    
 *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.001      
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6.1 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
Regressions ran with one-year-election lag do not change the values of the election dummy, 
nor does it become significant. The election dummy can thus not prove any effects of 
changing price level during and around election season. The PBC model cannot be rejected 
because of the insignificant value of the coefficients. On a regional level, the coefficients for 
the South America dummy in the 9th regression turned significant on a 10% level, stating that 
South America has 2,89% higher inflation rate than Europe. How does the interacting effect 
with the ELEt+1 raise the significance for the South America coefficient? Since the coefficient 
is not highly significant (10%) and turned significant in the third regression, it would be far-
fetched to draw any strict conclusions. The goodness of fit (R2-values) remains the same. 
Because of the absence of significance among the coefficients, the model might be specified 
wrong and lacking variables. Therefore, I included unemployment as an independent variable, 
following Nordhaus’s theory on the Phillips-cycle, highlighting the trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation. The unemployment coefficient proved to be insignificant, and 
did not raise the goodness of fit. 6.2 PATHS OF INFERENTIAL IMPROVEMENT 
In order to gain greater significance for the results, I will present some technical and data 
modifications, aiming at improving the quality of a future inferential analysis. 6.2.1 REGIONAL DUMMIES 
Regional dummies might not prove apt when describing a larger population of countries, 
given that these countries are fundamentally different. The differences could prevail on 
national as well as regional levels. The electorate, lacking traditions of electoral politics, a 
limited media and/or free press1 diverges between countries, especially in the Middle East 
region. The incentives of staying in power also matter, especially if there are many ego rents 
for politicians to reap. Thus, time inconsistent behavior may prevail. Institutions enforcing 
free press and electoral rights and scrutinizing the government also differ between countries. 
Land dummies could mitigate possible biases from region dummies, failing to describe the 
countries characteristics. But some of the region dummies carry only a small sample of 
countries2, still not gaining any significance. The regions considered, Oceania and North                                                                1 Included as a dependent variable in Shi and Svensson 2005. 
2 See table A4 in Appendix. 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America, are geographically close and similar economies, which supports the argument that 
the greater regions with higher divergence would benefit in an inferential analysis from land 
dummies. 6.2.2 THE CENTRAL BANK INDEX  
The Central Bank Index of Polillo and Guillén has been criticized, and do not contribute with 
any explanation for our regressions. As mentioned earlier, the index offers greater accuracy 
when applied on countries with small divergence between juridical and institutional practice. 
Assessing the quality of the CBI for each country, and applying it judiciously might improve 
the inferential accuracy.  6.2.3 THE ELECTION DUMMY 
The election dummy is simple, registering elections on a year-basis. Thus, it is hard to 
monitor effects and swift changes that might occur. Quarterly data on inflation and a more 
specific election variable could catch possible effects. But for an extensive panel data, supply 
of such detailed information is scarce.  6.2.4 INFLATION 
Inflation is in this study measured as the annual percentage change in CPI. Alesina et. al 
(1992) also revised the empirical proof of PBCs for larger set of countries, but used ”growth 
of money supply” as the dependent variable. The dependent variable in this study, inflation, 
might be more general and lack the precision of “growth in the monetary base” when 
detecting opportunistic monetary operations. However, the aim of this study is to analyze 
what implications political shocks has on for the consumer, and thus CPI is a more apt 
measure for the impacts on the consumer. Alesina’s study found that the year of election was 
not significant and also had the wrong sign, implying that the monetary base did decrease 
during elections (Alesina et al 1992, p.13-14) 6.2.5 UNEMPLOYMENT 
Nordhaus’s original PBC treated the Phillippsian trade-off between unemployment and 
inflation, a phenomenon that partisan models connected to the ideological position of the 
party. According to the findings of this study, no proof can be given for increasing inflation 
during election season, but unemployment as a dependent variable has not been tested. There 
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might be some findings on a partisan model, but a test that rejects a left-wing government1, 
will not attribute all the observed elections to inflation averse parties, since we assume that 
the elections are normally distributed for left- and right-wing governments. 
            
                                                               1 Left‐wing parties give higher priority to low unemployment than stabilizing the price level, according to the partisan theory. 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7. DISCUSSION 
Using the arguments of Nordhaus’s opportunistic model outlined in the theory section, I will 
assess the results of the inferential analysis.  7.1 PARTIES 
Parties are interpreted as opportunistic in the model, striving for re-election and maximizing 
the votes. The findings cannot exclude nor confirm this point, but broaden the spectra of the 
incumbents. The lack of findings for opportunism shed light on alternative models such as the 
partisan, where the motivations are ideological and not simply opportunistic and vote-
maximizing. The partisan model lack ability to explain the absence of price increases, since 
impeded by it’s rather two dimensional view of parties as either pro-employment or inflation 
averse. As Alesina points out, (Drazen 2001, p.117) one policy does not have to exclude the 
other. Parties may use policies different, depending on the characteristics of the electorate (or, 
if vote-maximizing, the median voter) and the economic situation. 7.2 VOTERS 
Drawing conclusions on the electorate should be done with caution, since the model does not 
register who wins the elections, and thus cannot detect patterns of electoral behavior. The 
opportunistic model argues that voters asses the incumbent party based on past 
accomplishments, and do not look prospectively when deciding on what party to vote for. 
According to the argument, there would be no use in giving up the short-run gains of generous 
public spending before an election. The time inconcistent public spending and the electorates’ 
imperfect info can be questioned from the findings. If the electorate lacks perfect information, 
this would create a leeway for pre-election spending, given that the party not deviate from the 
vote-maximizing aims. 7.3 THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
The opportunistic model assumes that parties have control over policy instruments, and policy 
is effective. The findings show no signs of an opportunistic model, or that the policy 
instruments may not have influence on the real economy. However, if the politicians are 
opportunistic, the policies might not work. Or the politicians are not opportunistic and the 
policy instruments work. Considering issues of timing of shocks, the robustness test cannot 
find evidence for lags in presumed election shocks. 
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7.4 THE SOURCES OF SHOCKS  
The Nordhausian model argues that shocks are internal to the economy and are assumed to 
come from political decisions. Since the robustness test and fixed effects regression mitigates 
for external effects, I cannot exclude the theory nor do I find evidence for internal shocks 
stemming from political decisions.  If elections for the set of countries analyzed do not pose 
shocks to the economies, it is time to question if the period of 1996-2009 displays certain 
characteristics or trends in politico-economic policy-making. This period is marked by global 
growth and a raise in multinational interdependency. But assuming that the benefits of growth 
trickled down to the state level making pre-election spending unnecessary would be much of a 
far-fetched argument. Differences on national levels do still prevail, and governments’ ability 
to collect ego gains has not diminished globally over a decade. Institutions and behavior even 
more, do not change overnight.  
Since a majority of the studies on PBCs during the last decade have focused on fiscal policies, 
I will discuss the relation between fiscal and monetary policies briefly. 7.5 FISCAL VS. MONETARY POLICIES 
In line with Drazen (2001, p.99), the role of PBC might hold for manipulations of fiscal 
policy, and for less of monetary policy. Even though fiscal policy instruments may not be as 
direct as strictly monetary operations, i.e. increasing the M2, an inflationary effect stemming 
from fiscal spending cannot be excluded. Wooley (1984) and Beck (1987) argue that the 
central bank rather follows the executive branch’s demands for monetary policy during 
election year, avoiding too high fluctuations in the interest rate.  But these statements are 
based exclusively upon examining the U.S Central Bank Federal Reserve, and cannot be taken 
valid on a global level.  
Shi and Svensson (2005) found that running a government deficit prior to election prevails on 
a larger scale in developing countries. Since the governments in developed countries often are 
large (supported and sometimes fueled by foreign aid) and play a major part in the domestic 
economy, any increased spending would probably influence the price level. Even though a 
large part of the economies are made up by the informal sector, some price increases will 
eventually trickle down. The pre-election stimuli of generous election promises also gain 
more through publicity, and thus do not stay in the informal sector. Alesina argues in Drazen 
that the aspects are more profound than the choice between fiscal or monetary tools. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
The PBC developed by Nordhaus argued that economies suffer from an inflationary jump 
during or connected the election season. I find no evidence for inflation jumps around election 
year on a global level during the years 1996-2009. On the contrary to Nordhaus’s theory on 
Political Business Cycles, my regressions show that applying such a model give no 
statistically robust results. Thus, I conclude that the theory cannot be rejected. The inferential 
tests of this study show no signs of connection between elections and increasing inflation. 
Instead, the analysis shows some signs of a decrease in inflation during election season. These 
results are not significant, but the trend towards lower inflation is interesting since it questions 
opportunism in politics and the prevalence and effect of government policies. Is there a 
political business cycle at all? Earlier Studies on fiscal spending (Shi & Svensson, 2005) has 
detected a pattern of pre-election government spending. However, this study cannot verify 
that the policies result in a price level increase. 
The effect of GDP on inflation is significant and negative throughout my tests, suggesting that 
GDP is a true determinant for lower inflation on a global level. Earlier, the rate of GDP 
growth has proven to be a negatively correlated to inflation (Fischer 1993). With these new 
findings, it can be concluded that the relative level of GDP determines inflation. The origin of 
the effects is yet to be explored, but a correlation between institutional stability and GDP 
might prove crucial in the argumentation. Lohmann (1998) examines the differences between 
juridical and institutional practice and one of the indicators of a refined and established 
institutional might be the relative level of GDP, offering an explanation to the confusing 
results of the central bank independence earlier in this paper. Another important characteristic 
of a relatively high GDP could be institutional convergence, occurring where high levels of 
GDP and geographic proximity is present. For further research an interesting take would be to 
assess the accuracy of CBI. With the findings of GDP determing inflation, that might be a 
better indicator of a country’s price level. The question remains, if it is the most precise 
instrument or if a refined central bank index could raise the significance of the regression.  
Future fields of research is to test the PBC on a panel data set with a greater supply of times 
series data and more precise variables on election, government deficit, growth of money 
supply and data on the ideological position of the parties. 
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10 APPENDIX 10.1 FIGURES 
 
 
 
Germany added as a reference point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1A: Inflation 1996-2010 
+ 
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10.2 TABLES 
 
Table A1: Regions and countries 
Variable Data specification 
Inflation Measured by the consumer price index and reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods 
and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as 
yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used.) 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross 
domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power 
parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over 
GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices 
is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data 
are in constant 2005 international dollars.  
Central Bank 
Independence 
 
The proxy for central bank independence is obtained from Cukierman-
Webb-Neyapti’s Central Bank Independence-index, modified by Polillo 
and Gullién (2005). The index is based upon an aggregate legal index and 
three indicators of actual independence: the rate of turnover of central bank 
governors, an index based on a questionnaire answered by specialists and 
the rate of the turnover. Time series cover the years 1989 – 2000. Due to 
lack of data for time series spanning from 2000-2009, some CBI-variables 
have been created through a weighted average.  
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Table A2: Collinearity 
Statistics   
Table A3: Correlation 
Statistics 
Model VIF   
Pearson 
Correlation   
(Constant)     Model Inflation 
dum_election 1,046   Inflation 1,000 
time dummy 1996 1,408   dum_election -,051 
time dummy 1997 1,419   time dummy 1996 ,118 
time dummy 1998 1,392   time dummy 1997 ,092 
time dummy 1999 1,378   time dummy 1998 ,029 
time dummy 2000 1,396   time dummy 1999 -,048 
time dummy 2001 1,392   time dummy 2000 -,033 
time dummy 2002 1,400   time dummy 2001 -,037 
time dummy 2003 1,402   time dummy 2002 -,019 
time dummy 2004 1,403   time dummy 2003 -,004 
time dummy 2005 1,413   time dummy 2004 -,029 
time dummy 2006 1,400   time dummy 2005 -,008 
time dummy 2007 1,410   time dummy 2006 -,021 
time dummy 2008 1,406   time dummy 2007 -,029 
time dummy 2009 1,411   time dummy 2008 ,103 
reg_centralamerica 2,066   time dummy 2009 -,056 
reg_northamerica 1,419   reg_subsahara ,196 
reg_southasia 1,266   reg_centralamerica -,032 
reg_oceania 1,466   reg_northamerica -,068 
reg_middleeast 1,676   reg_southasia -,042 
reg_southamerica 1,519   reg_oceania -,063 
reg_eastasia 1,377   reg_middleeast -,050 
reg_europe 3,121   reg_southamerica ,089 
ln_GDP 2,840   reg_eastasia ,022 
Central Bank 1,768   reg_europe -,172 
    ln_GDP -,324 
    Central Bank -,092 
 
 
 
 
VIF-values are well below the limit 10, posed by Pallant (2007, p.156). 
None of the Pearson Correlation values reaches the limit of 0,7 (Pallant 2007, p.155), which concludes 
no multicollinearity. 
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Table A4: Regions and countries     
Central America Europe North America Sub Sahara 
Antigua and Barbuda Belgium Canada Angola 
Bahamas, The Cyprus United States Benin 
Barbados Denmark  Burundi 
Belize Estonia Oceania Cameroon 
Costa Rica France Australia Cap Verde 
Dominican Republic Germany New Zealand Comoros 
El Salvador Ireland  
Congo 
Republic 
Grenada Italy South America Congo, D.R 
Guatemala Luxembourg Argentina Ethiopia 
Guyana Moldova Bolivia Gambia 
Haiti Netherlands Brazil Ghana 
Honduras Norway Colombia Kenya 
Jamaica Spain Ecuador Liberia 
Mexico Sweden Paraguay Malawi 
Nicaragua Switzerland Peru Mali 
Panama Turkey Uruguay Mauritius 
St. Kitts & Nevis United Kingdom Venezuela RB Mozambique 
St. Lucia   Niger 
St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines    Nigeria 
   Seychelles 
East Asia and Pacific 
Middle East and North 
Africa South Asia South Africa 
Bangladesh Bahrain Hongkong SAR,China Sudan 
Cambodia Iraq Nepal Swaziland 
Fiji Israel  Tanzania 
Indonesia Jordan  Uganda 
Lao PDR Kuwait  Zambia 
Malaysia Morocco   
Papua New Guinea Pakistan   
Phillipines Tunisia   
Samoa Yemen Rep.   
Solomon Islands    
Tonga    
Vietnam    
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Table A5: Regional Inflation     
Region Mean St. Deviation N 
Central America 5,82 5,37 276 
East Asia & Pacific 6,95 7,99 178 
Europé 2,98 3,51 246 
Middle East & North-
Africa 4,98 6,04 132 
North America 2,17 0,89 30 
Oceania 2,49 1,09 30 
South-Asia 3,78 4,45 30 
Sub-Sahara 9,49 14,46 357 
South-America 8,97 7,7 129 
 
